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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This is a case about form and substance in decisions 
about eligibility for social security benefits.  The Appellee, 
Russell Hess, III, invites us to give supremacy to form.  While 
form is not irrelevant in the scripted analytical steps called for 
when determining if someone is disabled, Hess’s invitation 
would lead to the hidebound circumstance in which an 
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) would have to “chant every 
magic word correctly” or an otherwise thorough and well-
reasoned opinion “would have to be remanded[.]”  United 
States v. Hickman, 991 F.2d 1110, 1115 (3d Cir. 1993) (Roth, 
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J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The law makes 
no such demand.  Cf. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1157 
(2019) (“Where Biestek goes wrong, at bottom, is in pressing 
for a categorical rule[.] … The inquiry, as is usually true in 
determining the substantiality of evidence, is case-by-case.”). 
 
 The ALJ who ruled on Hess’s application for social 
security disability benefits concluded that Hess had “moderate 
difficulties” in “concentration, persistence or pace,” but the 
ALJ offered a detailed explanation for why she believed those 
difficulties were not serious and why Hess was nevertheless 
capable of performing simple tasks.  (App. at 32.)  Based on 
that analysis, she found that Hess was “limited to jobs requiring 
understanding, remembering, and carrying out only simple 
instructions and making only simple work-related decisions[.]”  
(App. at 33-34.)  In a series of hypothetical questions meant to 
include Hess’s limitations, she asked a vocational expert 
whether there were jobs in the national economy available to 
someone with those limitations.  The expert said there were.  
The ALJ thus decided that Hess was not disabled and rejected 
his claim for benefits.   
 
 Hess then filed this lawsuit challenging the ALJ’s 
decision.  The District Court determined that the ALJ had erred 
because, in the limitations she described in her hypothetical 
questions to the vocational expert, she failed to include or 
account for her finding that Hess had “moderate” difficulties 
in “concentration, persistence, or pace.”  Accordingly, the 
Court ordered the case remanded to the ALJ.     
 
 The government now appeals.  It argues that an ALJ’s 
statement of a limitation confining a person to “simple 
tasks” – like the limitation statement at issue here – is 
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permissible after a finding of “moderate” difficulties in 
“concentration, persistence, or pace,” if the ALJ offers a “valid 
explanation” for it.  According to the government, the 
explanation given by the ALJ in this case was “valid,” and the 
District Court failed to give it due consideration.  We agree 
and, for the reasons that follow, will remand the case to the 
District Court with instructions to enter judgment for the 
government. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
A. The Social Security Disability Determination 
  Methodology 
 
 Social security cases can be complex, in part because of 
the labyrinthine regulatory structure that governs them.  The 
matter before us involves the part of that structure controlling 
disability determinations. 
 
The Social Security Administration, working through 
ALJs, decides whether a claimant is disabled by following a 
now familiar five-step analysis.  20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 
416.920(a)(4) (2016).1  The burden of proof is on the claimant 
at all steps except step five, where the burden is on the 
Commissioner of Social Security.  Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. 
Sec., 631 F.3d 632, 634 (3d Cir. 2010).  The analysis proceeds 
as follows: 
                                              
1 In this opinion, we cite to the edition of the Code of 
Federal Regulations in force at the time of the ALJ’s decision 
in this case.  There have been changes to social security 
regulations since that time, but those changes do not affect our 
analysis, and neither party contends that they should.   
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At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is 
performing “substantial gainful activity[.]”  20 C.F.R. 
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i).  If he is, he is not 
disabled.  Id.  Otherwise, the ALJ moves on to step two. 
 
At step two, the ALJ considers whether the claimant has 
any “severe medically determinable physical or mental 
impairment” that meets certain regulatory requirements.  Id. 
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii).  A “severe 
impairment” is one that “significantly limits [the claimant’s] 
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities[.]”  Id. 
§§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c).  If the claimant lacks such an 
impairment, he is not disabled.  Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 
416.920(a)(4)(ii).  If he has such an impairment, the ALJ 
moves on to step three. 
 
At step three, the ALJ decides “whether the claimant’s 
impairments meet or equal the requirements of an impairment 
listed in the regulations[.]”  Smith, 631 F.3d at 634.  If the 
claimant’s impairments do, he is disabled.  20 C.F.R. 
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii).  If they do not, the 
ALJ moves on to step four. 
 
At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s “residual 
functional capacity” (“RFC”) and whether he can perform his 
“past relevant work.”2  Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 
                                              
2 There is some ambiguity in the case law as to whether 
RFC is assessed at step four or at the end of step three.  
Compare Hurd v. Astrue, 621 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(“Before moving to step four, the ALJ must determine a 
claimant’s residual functional capacity[.]”), with Moon v. 
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416.920(a)(4)(iv).  A claimant’s “[RFC] is the most [he] can 
still do despite [his] limitations.”  Id. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 
416.945(a)(1).  If the claimant can perform his past relevant 
work despite his limitations, he is not disabled.  Id. 
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv).  If he cannot, the 
ALJ moves on to step five. 
 
At step five, the ALJ examines whether the claimant 
“can make an adjustment to other work[,]” considering his 
“[RFC,] … age, education, and work experience[.]”  Id. 
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v).  That examination 
typically involves “one or more hypothetical questions posed 
by the ALJ to [a] vocational expert.”  Podedworny v. Harris, 
745 F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1984).  If the claimant can make an 
adjustment to other work, he is not disabled.  20 C.F.R. 
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v).  If he cannot, he is 
disabled. 
 
When, as in this instance, mental impairments are at 
issue, additional inquiries are layered on top of the basic five-
step disability analysis.  Id. §§ 404.1520a(a), 416.920a(a).  An 
ALJ assesses mental impairments in the following way. 
                                              
Colvin, 763 F.3d 718, 720 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he ALJ was 
required to determine [the claimant’s] ‘residual  functional 
capacity’ at step four.”).  The ALJ treated it as an intermediate 
step between steps three and four.  (See infra n.5.)  We 
acknowledge that the social security regulations state that, 
“[b]efore [the ALJ] go[es] from step three to step four, [he] 
assess[es] [the claimant’s] residual functional capacity.”  20 
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).  But, because we find 
it simpler to consider the RFC assessment with step four, we 
will treat the RFC assessment as part of step four. 
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As part of step two of the disability analysis, the ALJ 
decides whether the claimant has any “medically determinable 
mental impairment(s).”  Id. §§ 404.1520a(b)(1), 
416.920a(b)(1); see also id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 
416.920(a)(4)(ii) (providing that, at step two, the ALJ 
determines whether the claimant has “a severe medically 
determinable physical or mental impairment”).  Then, as part 
of that same step and also step three of the disability analysis, 
the ALJ determines “the degree of functional limitation 
resulting from the impairment(s)[.]”  Id. §§ 404.1520a(b)(2), 
416.920a(b)(2); see also id. §§ 404.1520a(d), 416.920a(d), 
404.1520(a)(4)(ii)-(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii)-(iii) (explaining that 
the ALJ uses “the degree of functional limitation” in assessing 
“the severity of [the claimant’s] mental impairment(s)[,]” 
which is considered at steps two and three).   The ALJ does so 
in “four broad functional areas … : Activities of daily living; 
social functioning; concentration, persistence, or pace; and 
episodes of decompensation.”  Id. §§ 404.1520a(c)(3), 
416.920a(c)(3).  The first three of those areas are rated on a 
“five-point scale: None, mild, moderate, marked, and 
extreme.”  Id. §§ 404.1520a(c)(4), 416.920a(c)(4).  The fourth 
is rated on a scale of: “None, one or two, three, four or more.”  
Id.   
 
The ALJ uses that degree rating in “determin[ing] the 
severity of [the] mental impairment(s)[,]” which is considered 
at steps two and three.  Id. §§ 404.1520a(d), 416.920a(d); see 
also id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii)-(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii)-(iii) 
(stating that, at steps two and three, the ALJ “consider[s] the 
medical severity of [the claimant’s] impairment(s)”).  
“If … the degree of [the claimant’s] limitation in the first three 
functional areas [is] ‘none’ or ‘mild’ and ‘none’ in the fourth 
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area, [the ALJ] will generally conclude that [the claimant’s] 
impairment(s) is not severe, unless the evidence otherwise 
indicates that there is more than a minimal limitation in [his] 
ability to do basic work activities.”  Id. §§ 404.1520a(d)(1), 
416.920a(d)(1) (citation omitted).   
 
At step three, if the ALJ has found that a mental 
impairment is severe, he “then determine[s] if it meets or is 
equivalent in severity to a listed mental disorder.”  Id. 
§§ 404.1520a(d)(2), 416.920a(d)(2); see also id. 
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii) (explaining that, at 
step three, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has “an 
impairment(s) that meets or equals” a listed impairment).  That 
analysis is done “by comparing the medical findings about [the 
claimant’s] impairment(s) and the rating of the degree of 
functional limitation to the criteria of the appropriate listed 
mental disorder.”  Id.  §§ 404.1520a(d)(2), 416.920a(d)(2).  
For example, the claimant may have the equivalent of a listed 
impairment if, inter alia, he has at least two of “1. Marked 
restriction of activities of daily living; or 2. Marked difficulties 
in maintaining social functioning; or 3. Marked difficulties in 
maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; or 4. Repeated 
episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration[.]”  Id. 
Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1.   
 
Finally, to complete steps four and five of the disability 
analysis, if the ALJ has found that the claimant does not have 
a listed impairment or its equivalent, the ALJ “will then assess 
[the claimant’s mental RFC].”  Id. §§ 404.1520a(d)(3), 
416.920a(d)(3); see also id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv)-(v), 
416.920(a)(4)(iv)-(v) (providing that, at steps four and five, the 
ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC). 
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 With that regulatory framework in mind, we turn to the 
details of the case before us. 
 
B. Factual and Procedural Background 
 
1. Hess’s Social Security Application and  
 the ALJ’s Opinion 
 
 In August 2013, Hess applied for social security 
disability benefits.  After a hearing, the ALJ denied his claims.  
Her decision was based on her conclusion that Hess was not 
disabled within the meaning of the applicable regulations.  In 
reaching that conclusion, she followed the five-step disability 
analysis just outlined.     
 
 The ALJ’s reasoning and the findings she made are 
central to this case.  Consequently, we describe the relevant 
portions of her opinion in detail.  As to step one, however, it is 
sufficient to simply note that the ALJ determined Hess was not 
engaged in substantial gainful activity.   
 
 At step two, the ALJ found that Hess had multiple 
“severe impairments[.]”  (App. at 30.)  Specifically, she said 
that Hess suffered from: 
 
major depressive disorder single episode-mild, 
depressive disorder not otherwise specified, 
bipolar disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, 
history of conduct disorder and impulse control 
disorder, personality disorder not otherwise 
specified with antisocial tendencies, 
osteoarthritis and degenerative joint disease of 
the right ankle, cervical degenerative disc 
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disease, chronic pain disorder and history of 
opioid abuse and dependence. 
(App. at 30-31 (citations omitted).)3   
 
 At step three, the ALJ found that Hess’s mental 
impairments did not meet the standards for a “listed 
impairment[.]”  (App. at 31.)  In making that finding, she rated 
Hess in the four areas of mental functional limitation.4  As to 
“concentration, persistence or pace” – the area of functional 
limitation at issue here – she concluded that Hess had 
“moderate difficulties.”  (App. at 32.)  She reasoned that, 
although a state psychological consultant had rated Hess as 
having “not … more than mild limitation in this area of 
functioning,” that opinion was inconsistent with the record, 
including that Hess had been “diagnosed with mental health 
impairments, was in mental health treatment, and was 
prescribed mental health medications.”  (App. at 32, 37.) 
 
 The ALJ clarified, however, that she did not consider 
Hess’s “moderate”-level difficulties in “concentration, 
persistence, or pace” to be so serious that he could not perform 
simple tasks.  In her words: 
 
                                              
3 Only the impairments that affect Hess’s mental 
capabilities are at issue now. 
 
4 As earlier noted, those are “[a]ctivities of daily living; 
social functioning; concentration, persistence, or pace; and 
episodes of decompensation.”  20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c)(3), 
416.920a(c)(3). 
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[Hess’s] self-reported activities of daily living, 
such as doing laundry, taking care of his personal 
needs, shopping, working, and paying bills 
(when he has money), … are consistent with an 
individual who is able to perform simple, routine 
tasks.  Furthermore, progress notes from treating 
and examining sources generally indicate no 
serious problems in this area of functioning, 
reporting that [Hess] could perform simple 
calculations, was fully oriented, and had intact 
remote/recent memory. 
(App. at 32 (citations omitted).)  The “self-reported activities 
of daily living,” as referenced by the ALJ, were described more 
fully as follows: 
 
[Hess] reported he could care for his own 
personal needs and grooming, do laundry 
(although he needs help carrying the basket), 
clean, use public transportation, attend 
appointments, work part time, and go shopping 
in stores.  [Hess] also pays bills (when he has 
money), counts change, and uses money orders.  
[Hess] testified that he works three days a week 
for five to six hours as a dishwasher, and he 
keeps track of the pantry items, checking for 
empty boxes and out of date food items. 
(App. at 32 (citations omitted).) 
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 At step four, the ALJ performed an RFC assessment.5  
She decided that Hess was “limited to jobs requiring 
understanding, remembering, and carrying out only simple 
instructions and making only simple work-related decisions[.]”  
(App. at 33-34.)  In selecting that limitation, the ALJ engaged 
in a detailed examination of the record, from which she 
concluded that Hess’s mental difficulties were such that he was 
capable of performing simple tasks. 
 
 The ALJ first noted that Hess’s self-reported symptoms 
could “reasonably be expected” to flow from his “medically 
determinable impairments[.]”  (App. at 34.)  Those symptoms 
included “trouble with concentration and completing 
tasks[,] …. trouble with written and verbal 
instructions[,] … [inability to] handle stress very 
well[,] …. racing thoughts, a lot of scrambled thoughts, and 
trouble sleeping.”  (App. at 34 (citations omitted).)  The ALJ 
found, however, that his “statements concerning the intensity, 
persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms [were] not 
entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other 
evidence in the record[.]”  (App. at 34-35.) 
 
To support that finding, and to evaluate Hess’s 
capabilities more generally, the ALJ analyzed each source of 
relevant evidence.  Specifically, she looked to mental status 
examinations and reports, opinion evidence, Hess’s Global 
Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) scores, his mental health 
                                              
5 More precisely, as earlier noted (supra n.2), the ALJ 
viewed the RFC assessment as an intermediate step between 
steps three and four.  As also noted, however, we will treat the 
RFC assessment as an element of step four. 
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treatment history, his activities of daily living, and a report by 
one of Hess’s longtime friends.   
 
Regarding the evidence from mental status 
examinations and reports, the ALJ recognized that Hess had 
“numerous mental health diagnoses” and was “intermittently 
engaged in formal mental health treatment, including therapy 
and psychotropic medications.”  (App. at 35 (citations 
omitted).)  Nevertheless, she decided that the evidence showed 
that Hess was not seriously limited and he was capable of 
functioning effectively.  For example, an October 2013 mental 
status examination revealed that Hess “was not currently 
taking any psychotropic medications”; “had fair hygiene and 
grooming, good eye contact, a pleasant and friendly attitude, a 
cooperative attitude, goal directed thought processes, no 
delusions or paranoia, appropriate affect, neutral mood, full 
orientation, adequate recent/remote memory, and adequate 
impulse control”; and “could perform simple mathematical 
calculations.”  (App. at 36 (citation omitted).)  Likewise, a 
February 2014 mental status examination showed that Hess 
had “appropriate dress and grooming, cooperative attitude, 
good eye contact, normal speech, goal directed thought 
processing, full orientation, and no suicidal and homicidal 
ideations.”  (App. at 36 (citation omitted).)  Furthermore, an 
August 2015 mental status examination demonstrated “neat 
and clean hygiene and grooming, a cooperative attitude, 
normal speech, full orientation, and normal memory.”  (App. 
at 36 (citations omitted).)  Additionally, the ALJ noted that 
records from a period of close observation that Hess had in 
2014 did “not contain any references to psychologically based 
problems[.]”  (App. at 36.) 
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The ALJ acknowledged that a March 2015 mental status 
examination “allude[d] to an inability to work,” as well as “a 
depressed mood and poor insight/judgment[.]”  (App. at 36, 
38.)  But she assigned “[a]ny report of an inability to 
work … little weight” because it was inconsistent with the 
record, the examination itself contained “no function by 
function opinion on th[at] issue,” and Hess’s inability to work 
was self-reported.  (App. at 38.)  Moreover, the examination 
was not all negative.  It revealed “fair hygiene, fair eye contact, 
a cooperative attitude, normal speech, a calm affect, full 
orientation, and goal directed thought processing.”  (App. at 
36.) 
 
Moving on to the opinion evidence, the ALJ similarly 
found that it showed Hess’s mental difficulties left him capable 
of engaging in simple work.  For example, she explained that 
Dr. Schwartz, a psychologist, opined that Hess “had ‘mild’ 
limitations in his ability to understand and remember simple 
instructions[,]” had “‘moderate’ limitations in his ability to 
carry out simple instructions[,]” “could perform simple, 
unskilled work with additional restrictions in social and 
adaptive functioning[,]” and had “‘marked’ limitations in his 
ability to respond appropriately to usual work pressures or 
changes in a routine work setting.”  (App. at 36-37 (citation 
omitted).)  The ALJ assigned most of that opinion “great 
weight[,]” but she gave “little weight” to the conclusion that 
Hess had “marked” limitations because it was inconsistent with 
the record generally and with a mental status examination 
Dr. Schwartz himself had performed, and because it was 
“based predominantly upon [Hess’s] subjective complaints[.]”  
(App. at 37.) 
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The ALJ also examined the opinion of a “treating 
mental health provider[,]” who said that Hess “could perform 
simple unskilled work but had ‘marked’ limitations in … his 
ability consistently to concentrate, persist, and keep pace in a 
routine work setting.”  (App. at 37 (citation omitted).)  The ALJ 
again rejected the “marked” rating as inconsistent with the 
record.  In doing so, she noted that Hess “was able to work 
part-time as a dishwasher and tolerate [a period of structured 
supervision] without any reports of behavioral issues or 
problems completing tasks.”  (App. at 37.)  She further 
highlighted the mental status examinations – which “regularly 
and routinely described [Hess] as cooperative and calm, having 
normal speech, full orientation, and logical thought 
processes” – and observed that the record did “not contain 
frequent references to fatigue, anhedonia, or staying in bed all 
day.”  (App. at 37.)6 
 
As to Hess’s GAF scores, the ALJ also deemed them 
not to be indicative of significant mental health difficulties.  
She acknowledged that Hess received “scores ranging from 
serious symptoms to moderate symptoms.”  (App. at 36 
(citations omitted).)  But, she gave the GAF scores reflecting 
more serious symptoms “little weight” because they were “not 
consistent with the underlying mental status examinations[,]” 
Hess’s “own reported daily activities[,]” and “the record as [a] 
whole that did not reveal frequent or regular serious 
symptoms.”  (App. at 37-38 (citations omitted).)  Additionally, 
the ALJ explained that Hess’s “most recent 
                                              
6 The ALJ additionally considered the state 
psychological consultant’s opinion referenced in our 
discussion of step three above, to which, as noted there, she 
gave little weight.   
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scores … indicat[ed] that [Hess] was experiencing moderate 
work-related mental health symptoms.”  (App. at 36 (citations 
omitted).)  She assigned the GAF scores reflecting less serious 
symptoms “great weight” because they were “more consistent 
with the record” and more accurately captured Hess’s “overall 
functioning.”  (App. at 38 (citations omitted).)  In doing so, the 
ALJ again cited the mental status examinations, which 
“revealed few serious symptoms,” the fact that Hess was “able 
to work part time as a dishwasher,” and records from close 
observation that “did not reveal any serious behavioral 
issues[.]”  (App. at 38.) 
 
Regarding Hess’s mental health treatment history, the 
ALJ reasoned that it neither supported the claimed severity 
level of Hess’s symptoms nor suggested that he was unable to 
perform simple tasks.  She said that Hess was “not always 
compliant with treatment … and ha[d] been discharged from 
treatment due to non-compliance”; “experienced short 
hospitalizations” in 2013 and 2015 “due in part to narcotics 
misuse and heroin addiction”; and “was not fully engaged in 
substance abuse treatment until” 2015.  (App. at 36.)  She 
noted, though, that Hess was then in a treatment program that 
began in August 2015, had been compliant with that treatment, 
and his symptoms had improved.   
 
Turning to Hess’s daily activities, the ALJ likewise 
found that those activities were not suggestive of symptoms as 
serious as Hess claimed, and that they instead demonstrated an 
ability to engage in simple work.  As part of the RFC analysis, 
the ALJ reiterated what she had earlier said at step three 
concerning Hess’s daily activities; namely, that Hess “takes 
care of his own personal needs and grooming, does 
laundry[,] … cleans, uses public transportation, attends 
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appointments, works part time, … goes shopping in stores[,] 
…. pays bills (when he has money), counts change, … uses 
money orders[,] …. [w]orks three days a week for five to six 
hours as a dishwasher, and … keeps track of the pantry items 
checking for empty boxes and out of date food items.”  (App. 
at 36-37 (citations omitted).) 
 
Finally, the ALJ reviewed a report by a longtime friend 
of Hess’s stating that Hess “could cook daily, play computer 
games, pay bills, follow instructions good, pay attention for a 
long time, go shopping in stores, use public transportation, and 
take care of his own personal needs and grooming.”  (App. at 
38 (citation omitted).)  The ALJ assigned that report “partial 
weight insofar as it [was] consistent with the record as a 
whole[.]”  (App. at 38.) 
 
The ALJ ultimately concluded that she had discerned 
“appropriate limitations” to account for Hess’s “mental 
impairments” and that those “impairments and the restrictions 
caused by them would not prevent him from performing 
sedentary, unskilled work as defined … in the [RFC].”  (App. 
at 38-39.)  She said that her RFC determination was based on 
her findings as to Hess’s functional limitations (e.g., as to 
“concentration, persistence, or pace”) and “all the evidence 
with consideration of the limitations and restrictions imposed 
by the combined effects of all [of Hess’s] medically 
determinable impairments[.]”  (App. at 34.)  She particularly 
cited the mental status examinations, “the objective medical 
evidence … [Hess’s] non-compliance [with treatment], the 
opinion evidence, and [Hess’s] activities of daily 
living.”  (App. at 38.)   
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At step five,7 the ALJ found that there were “jobs … in 
significant numbers in the national economy that [Hess could] 
perform” and, thus, she concluded that Hess was not disabled.  
(App. at 39.)  She based that conclusion on answers to 
hypothetical questions she posed to a vocational expert about 
whether there were jobs “in the national economy for an 
individual with [Hess’s] age, education, work experience, and 
[RFC].”  (App. at 40.)  [App. at 40, 43-45.] 
 
2. Hess’s Lawsuit and the District Court’s 
  Decision 
 
After the ALJ denied his claim for disability benefits, 
Hess appealed to the Social Security Administration Appeals 
Council, which denied his request for review.  Accordingly, the 
ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner 
of Social Security.  Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 
356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011).  Hess then filed suit to challenge that 
decision, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).8   
                                              
7 The ALJ moved on to step five because she found that 
Hess could not perform his “past relevant work[.]”  (App. at 
39.)  That finding was based on all of Hess’s limitations, 
including those not at issue here.   
 
8 Section 405(g) provides, in relevant part, “Any 
individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of 
Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, 
irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review 
of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days 
after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within 
such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may 
allow.”  42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 
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The case was referred to a Magistrate Judge, who wrote 
a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) in Hess’s favor.  
According to the Magistrate Judge, the ALJ’s decision was 
inadequate because she failed to “include in her RFC 
assessment, or in any hypothetical relied upon, her finding that 
[Hess] has [a] moderate limitation in maintaining 
concentration, persistence or pace” and “did not otherwise 
account for this finding in her RFC assessment or in any 
hypothetical question.”  (App. at 19.)  That, the Magistrate 
Judge said, ran afoul of our decision in Ramirez v. Barnhart, 
372 F.3d 546 (3d Cir. 2004), which the Judge understood to 
hold “that, when an ALJ finds that a claimant has [a moderate] 
degree of limitation in maintaining concentration, persistence 
or pace, she must include this limitation in any hypothetical 
question posed to a [vocational expert] that the ALJ wishes to 
rely upon” and “that this degree of limitation must be reflected 
in the RFC assessment.”  (App. at 19.)  The Magistrate Judge 
otherwise rejected all of Hess’s challenges to the ALJ’s 
decision.   
 
 The District Court approved and adopted the R&R.  In 
doing so, it made some additional comments about the case.  
The Court explained that Ramirez “reiterated that a 
hypothetical must account for all of an applicant’s 
impairments” and “disapproved of a hypothetical restricting an 
applicant’s potential work to ‘simple tasks’ when an ALJ also 
finds that the applicant ‘often’ has deficiencies in 
concentration, persistence, or pace.”  (App. at 7 n.1 (citation 
omitted).)  It observed that, here, “the ALJ did not incorporate 
her finding of a ‘moderate’ limitation in concentration, 
persistence, or pace in a hypothetical she posed to the 
vocational expert” but rather “asked the vocational expert if a 
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person ‘limited to jobs requiring understanding, remembering, 
and carrying out only simple instructions making only simple, 
work related decisions …’ could perform a job in the national 
economy.”  (App. at 7 n.1.)  The District Court concluded, in 
line with the Magistrate Judge’s R&R, that the ALJ had 
violated Ramirez and the case must be remanded for further 
administrative proceedings.9   
 
 The government timely appealed.   
 
II. DISCUSSION10 
 The somewhat complicated question on appeal is 
whether the ALJ’s limitation of Hess “to jobs requiring 
understanding, remembering, and carrying out only simple 
instructions and making only simple work-related decisions[,]” 
as noted in the RFC determination at step four of the disability 
                                              
9 The District Court also noted that “three unreported 
Third Circuit cases have held that a hypothetical restricting an 
applicant to simple tasks is sufficient even where an ALJ has 
determined that the applicant possesses moderate difficulties in 
concentration, persistent [sic] or pace[,]” but it determined 
those decisions to be inconsistent with Ramirez.  (App. at 7 
n.1.) 
 
10 The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 405(g).  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  “We exercise plenary review over legal conclusions 
reached by the Commissioner[,]” and “[w]e review the 
Commissioner’s factual findings for ‘substantial evidence[.]’”  
Chandler, 667 F.3d at 359 (citation omitted). 
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analysis and in the resulting hypothetical questions to the 
vocational expert at step five, was permissible in light of her 
finding, at step three, of “moderate difficulties” in 
“concentration, persistence or pace[.]”11  (App. at 32-34.)  The 
government argues that that limitation was acceptable because 
the ALJ offered a “valid explanation” for it.  Hess responds 
that such a limitation is forbidden by Ramirez, after a finding 
of “moderate” difficulties in “concentration, persistence, or 
pace.”  The government’s position is correct, and the District 
Court should not have disturbed the ALJ’s decision. 
 
A. The Functional Limitation Findings Do Not 
Require Particular Language to Appear in 
the Statement of the Limitation 
 The parties argue over whether an ALJ must use 
specific words in stating a limitation that will be employed at 
steps four and five of the disability analysis, based on the 
functional limitation findings at steps two and three, such as a 
finding of “moderate” difficulties in “concentration, 
persistence, or pace.”  The government says that an ALJ need 
not do so.  Hess responds that “the hypothetical posed to the 
vocational [expert] and the ALJ’s RFC assessment must 
incorporate all of the claimant’s limitations supported by the 
                                              
11 Here, the ALJ’s statement of Hess’s limitation was 
the same in the RFC and in the hypothetical questions.  That is 
frequently the case.  Cf. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 
416.920(a)(4)(v) (stating that an ALJ considers the claimant’s 
RFC at step five).  In this opinion, therefore, we often refer to 
the limitation language in the RFC and hypothetical questions 
collectively as the ALJ’s stated “limitation.” 
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medical record.”  (Answering Br. at 6.)  But the parties are 
talking past each other, and both are correct. 
 
It is true, as the government contends, that no 
incantations are required at steps four and five simply because 
a particular finding has been made at steps two and three.  
Those portions of the disability analysis serve distinct purposes 
and may be expressed in different ways.  When mental health 
is at issue, the functional limitation categories are “used to rate 
the severity of mental impairment(s)[.]”  SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 
374184, at *4 (July 2, 1996).  While obviously related to the 
limitation findings, the RFC is a determination of “the most [a 
claimant] can still do despite [his] limitations” “based on all 
the relevant evidence in [the] case record.”  20 C.F.R. 
§§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1); SSR 96-8P, at *2.  It 
“requires a more detailed assessment [of the areas of functional 
limitation] by itemizing various functions contained in the 
broad [functional limitation] categories[.]”  SSR 96-8P, at *4.  
And, unlike the findings at steps two and three, the RFC “must 
be expressed in terms of work-related functions[,]” such as by 
describing the claimant’s “abilities to: understand, carry out, 
and remember instructions; use judgment in making work-
related decisions; respond appropriately to supervision, co-
workers and work situations; and deal with changes in a routine 
work setting.”  Id. at *6.  In short, the findings at steps two and 
three will not necessarily translate to the language used at steps 
four and five. 
 
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, social 
security regulations permit, and indeed require, an ALJ to offer 
“a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports 
each” limitation at step four of the disability analysis.  Id. at 
*7.  That suggests a wide range of limitation language is 
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permissible, regardless of what the ALJ found at earlier steps 
of the analysis, so long as the chosen limitation language is 
explained. 
 
Nevertheless, as Hess maintains, the statement of a 
limitation does need to reflect the claimant’s particular 
impairments, including those embodied in the functional 
limitation findings.  “In assessing RFC, the adjudicator must 
consider limitations and restrictions imposed by all of an 
individual’s impairments, even those that are not ‘severe.’”  Id. 
at *5; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(c), 416.945(c) 
(explaining that a mental RFC assessment must begin with an 
examination of “the nature and extent of [the claimant’s] 
mental limitations and restrictions”).  And, again, although 
steps two and three differ from steps four and five, the 
functional limitation findings are plainly relevant to an ALJ’s 
statement of the claimant’s limitation at the later steps because 
they involve the claimant’s actual impairments.  Cf. SSR 96-
8P, at *4 (“The mental RFC assessment used at steps 4 and 5 
of the sequential evaluation process requires a more detailed 
assessment [of the areas of functional limitation] by itemizing 
various functions contained in the broad [functional limitation] 
categories[.]”). 
 
Our case law supports the conclusion that the findings 
at steps two and three are important to the ALJ’s statement of 
a claimant’s limitation but do not require the use of any 
particular language.  In Ramirez, we said: 
 
We cannot concur in the Commissioner’s 
[position that the functional limitation findings 
are relevant only at steps two and three of the 
disability analysis].  While [the pertinent 
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regulation] does state that the [functional 
limitation] findings are “not an RFC assessment” 
and that step four requires a “more detailed 
assessment,” it does not follow that the 
[functional limitation findings] play no role in 
steps four and five[.] 
372 F.3d at 555.  We clarified, however, that those findings 
need only be “adequately conveyed” in the ALJ’s statement of 
the limitation, not recited verbatim.  Compare id. at 552 n.2 
(observing that the claimant was arguing “that all of a 
claimant’s limitations must be adequately conveyed in the 
hypothetical[,]” not, as the government suggested, that 
functional limitation findings must be stated “verbatim in the 
hypothetical”), with id. at 554 (“[The ALJ’s chosen] 
limitations do not adequately convey all of [the claimant’s] 
limitations.” (emphasis added)).12 
 
In short, the functional limitation findings do not dictate 
the terms of the ALJ’s statement of the claimant’s limitation in 
the final analytical steps.  But those findings are relevant to that 
statement of the limitation, which must be sufficient to reflect 
all of a claimant’s impairments. 
 
                                              
12 We did say in Ramirez that “we hold that the ALJ’s 
hypothetical did not adequately capture and recite all of [the 
claimant’s] mental impairments and the limitations caused by 
those impairments.”  372 F.3d at 555 (emphasis added).  As 
demonstrated by the quoted language above, however, in the 
context of our opinion, “capture and recite” meant “adequately 
convey.” 
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B. A “Simple Tasks” Limitation Is Appropriate 
After a Finding of “Moderate” Difficulties in 
“Concentration, Persistence, or Pace,” if a 
“Valid Explanation” Is Given 
The next issue is whether a “simple tasks” limitation, 
like the one stated by the ALJ here, can be said to fairly reflect 
a claimant’s impairments when that claimant has been found 
to face “moderate” difficulties in “concentration, persistence, 
or pace.”  The government argues that such a statement of the 
limitation is acceptable, if an ALJ provides a “valid 
explanation.”  Hess responds that, under Ramirez, “a limitation 
to simple instructions and simple work-related decisions does 
not reflect a claimant’s moderate restrictions in concentration, 
persistence, or pace.”  (Answering Br. at 7-8.)  We agree with 
the government. 
 
1. The ALJ Chose a “Simple Tasks”  
  Limitation 
 
 Before reaching the merits of this issue, we must 
address one preliminary matter.  Both parties treat the 
limitation here – “to jobs requiring understanding, 
remembering, and carrying out only simple instructions and 
making only simple work-related decisions[,]”  (App. at 33-
34) – as equivalent to a limitation to “simple tasks.”  That is 
important because the case law they rely upon generally 
involves so-called “simple tasks” limitations. 
 
We agree with their interpretation of the ALJ’s framing 
of the limitation.  A limitation to “simple tasks” is 
fundamentally the same as one “to jobs requiring 
understanding, remembering, and carrying out only simple 
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instructions and making only simple work-related decisions[.]”  
(App. at 33-34;) see Davis v. Berryhill, 743 F. App’x 846, 850 
(9th Cir. 2018) (treating “understanding, remembering, and 
carrying out only simple instructions” as equivalent to “simple 
tasks”); Richards v. Colvin, 640 F. App’x 786, 790 (10th Cir. 
2016) (referring to a limitation “to understanding, 
remembering, and carrying out only simple instructions and 
making only simple work-related decisions” as a “simple-work 
limitation[]”).  Indeed, both formulations – the ALJ’s and the 
more concise phrase “simple tasks” – relate to mental abilities 
necessary to perform “unskilled work.”  See 20 C.F.R. 
§§ 404.1568(a), 416.968(a) (“Unskilled work is work which 
needs little or no judgment to do simple duties that can be 
learned on the job in a short period of time.”); SSR 96-9P, 1996 
WL 374185, at *9 (July 2, 1996) (concluding that “unskilled 
work” requires “[u]nderstanding, remembering, and carrying 
out simple instructions” and “[m]aking … simple work- 
related decisions”); cf. Richards, 640 F. App’x at 790 (treating 
“simple-work limitations” as similar to “unskilled work” 
limitations).  So the parties’ reliance on case law related to 
“simple tasks” is appropriate and helpful. 
 
2. Only a “Valid Explanation” Is 
Required 
Turning to the merits, the government is correct that, as 
long as the ALJ offers a “valid explanation,” a “simple tasks” 
limitation is permitted after a finding that a claimant has 
“moderate” difficulties in “concentration, persistence, or 
pace.”  That conclusion flows directly from our decision in 
Ramirez. 
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 In Ramirez, as Hess notes, we disapproved of a “simple 
tasks” limitation after an ALJ had found that a claimant 
suffered from deficiencies in “concentration, persistence, or 
pace” that arose “often[.]”  372 F.3d at 554-55.  We said that 
“a requirement that a job be limited to one to two step 
tasks … does not adequately encompass a finding that [the 
claimant] ‘often’ has ‘deficiencies in concentration, 
persistence, or pace[.]’”  Id. at 554 (citation omitted).  We were 
specifically concerned that such a limitation would “not take 
into account deficiencies in pace” because “[m]any employers 
require a certain output level from their employees over a given 
amount of time, and an individual with deficiencies in pace 
might be able to perform simple tasks, but not over an extended 
period of time.”  Id.  On the record then before us, it seemed 
likely that, if the claimant often had “deficiencies in pace and 
this had been included in the hypothetical,” the vocational 
expert would have “changed her answer as to whether there 
were jobs in the local or national economy that [the claimant] 
could perform[,]” given that  “the vocational expert testified 
that each of the jobs suitable for [the claimant] … would have 
daily production quotas and that [the claimant] would have to 
maintain a certain degree of pace to maintain those jobs.”  Id.  
In light of all that, we concluded that “[t]his omission from the 
hypothetical runs afoul of our directive in [Chrupcala v. 
Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, 1276 (3d Cir. 1987),] that a 
hypothetical question posed to a vocational expert must reflect 
all of a claimant’s impairments,” and conflicts with “our 
statement in [Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 122 (3d Cir. 
2002),] that ‘great specificity’ is required when an ALJ 
incorporates a claimant’s mental or physical limitations into a 
hypothetical.”  Id. at 554-55 (citations omitted). 
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We immediately noted, however, that ALJs are not 
forbidden from using “simple tasks” limitations.  An ALJ may 
frame a limitation in terms of “simple tasks” if – based on the 
facts of the case – the ALJ provides a “valid explanation” for 
doing so: 
 
Of course, [we said,] there may be a valid 
explanation for this omission from the ALJ’s 
hypothetical.  For example, the ALJ may have 
concluded that the deficiency in pace was so 
minimal or negligible that, even though [the 
claimant] “often” suffered from this deficiency, 
it would not limit her ability to perform simple 
tasks under a production quota. 
Id. at 555 (emphasis added). 
 
That we did not adopt a categorical rule regarding 
“simple tasks” limitations is confirmed by our discussion in 
Ramirez of case law from other circuits.  Specifically, we 
examined four decisions, two of which held that an ALJ’s 
limitation statement was adequate despite a finding that the 
claimant had deficiencies in “concentration, persistence, or 
pace,” id. at 552-53 (citing Howard v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 
577, 581-82 (8th Cir. 2001); Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 
378-79 (6th Cir. 2001)), and two of which held that the 
statement of limitation was insufficient in light of such a 
finding, id. at 553-54 (citing Kasarsky v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 
539, 544 (7th Cir. 2003); Newton v. Chater, 92 F.3d 688, 694-
95 (8th Cir. 1996)).  We emphasized that the outcome of each 
case turned on its particular facts.  Id. at 552-54.  That analysis 
animated our adoption of a fact-specific “valid explanation” 
approach. 
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In sum, Ramirez did not hold that there is any 
categorical prohibition against using a “simple tasks” 
limitation after an ALJ has found that a claimant “often” faces 
difficulties in “concentration, persistence, or pace.”  Rather, a 
“simple tasks” limitation is acceptable after such a finding, as 
long as the ALJ offers a valid explanation for it. 
 
Ramirez’s “valid explanation” rule remains the law in 
our circuit.13  That is true even though Ramirez dealt with a 
finding of difficulties in “concentration, persistence, or pace” 
that arose “often[,]” id. at 554-55, and here, due to a change in 
the regulatory rating scale, the ALJ expressed the limitation in 
different terms, saying that Hess had “moderate difficulties” in 
“concentration, persistence or pace,”14 (App. at 32.)  
                                              
13 Our sister circuits have also adopted fact-specific 
approaches to whether an ALJ’s chosen limitation is 
acceptable notwithstanding a finding of difficulties in 
“concentration, persistence, or pace.”  E.g., Scott v. Berryhill, 
855 F.3d 853, 855, 858 (8th Cir. 2017); Vigil v. Colvin, 805 
F.3d 1199, 1203-04 (10th Cir. 2015); Mascio v. Colvin, 780 
F.3d 632, 638 (4th Cir. 2015); Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
631 F.3d 1176, 1180-81 (11th Cir. 2011); Stubbs-Danielson v. 
Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1173-75 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 
14 The regulations previously assessed “concentration, 
persistence, or pace” on a scale of “never, seldom, often, 
frequent, and constant.”  Ramirez, 372 F.3d at 551.  The 
regulations at issue here assess that functional area using a 
scale of “[n]one, mild, moderate, marked, and extreme.”  20 
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c)(4), 416.920a(c)(4). 
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Regardless of the rating scale, “simple tasks” limitations have 
a relationship to abilities in “concentration, persistence, or 
pace” that makes a valid explanation necessary after a finding 
in that functional area. 
 
The relationship between “simple tasks” limitations and 
“concentration, persistence, or pace” is a close one.  Indeed, 
such limitations directly encompass and anticipate a minimal 
level of ability in that functional area.  Under the Social 
Security Administration’s Program Operations Manual System 
(“POMS”),15 “[u]nderstanding, carrying out, and remembering 
simple instructions” includes “[t]he ability to maintain 
concentration and attention for extended periods (the 
approximately 2-hour segments between arrival and first 
break, lunch, second break, and departure)[;] [t]he ability to 
perform activities within a schedule … [;] [t]he ability to 
sustain an ordinary routine without special 
supervision[;] … [and] [t]he ability to complete a normal 
                                              
15 We have characterized the POMS as “‘the publicly 
available operating instructions for processing Social Security 
claims.’  The Supreme Court has stated that ‘[w]hile these 
administrative interpretations are not products of formal 
rulemaking, they nevertheless warrant respect.’”  Kelley v. 
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 566 F.3d 347, 350 n.7 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(alteration in original) (citations omitted).  The POMS is 
especially entitled to respect in the present context, where the 
issue is whether the limitation chosen by the ALJ captured the 
claimant’s capabilities and conveyed them to the vocational 
expert, given that the POMS establishes the generally 
understood meaning of terms within the social security 
regulatory framework. 
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workday and workweek without interruptions from 
psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent 
pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest 
periods.”  POMS DI 25020.010(B)(2)(a).  In short, 
“concentration, persistence, or pace” is tightly linked to the 
capacity to complete “simple tasks.” 
 
Nevertheless, a “simple tasks” limitation alone does not 
account for the extent of a claimant’s difficulties in 
“concentration, persistence, or pace.”  Without explanation, 
such a limitation does not warrant a conclusion about whether 
a claimant’s difficulties in “concentration, persistence, or 
pace” are so serious that he cannot satisfy the functional 
requirements of “simple tasks.”  An explanation is thus 
important, regardless of the particular scale used for rating 
“concentration, persistence, or pace.”  It must be given whether 
difficulties in that area are said to arise “often” or are called 
“moderate” in severity.16 
 
 Based on their understanding of the import of Ramirez, 
the Magistrate Judge and the District Court concluded that the 
ALJ erred because she did not “explicitly include” her 
functional limitation finding as to “concentration, persistence 
or pace” in the RFC assessment or hypothetical questions, and 
that a “simple tasks” limitation was inadequate to address 
Hess’s circumstances.  (App. at 19.)  In light of that conclusion, 
neither the R&R nor the District Court’s opinion discussed the 
                                              
16 It is possible that the change in regulatory scale for 
measuring difficulties in “concentration, persistence, or pace” 
was more than a shift in the nomenclature.  But we need not 
decide that issue today, given that our “valid explanation” 
holding applies in any event. 
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sufficiency of the analysis that led to the ALJ’s “simple tasks” 
limitation.  That is problematic, for, as we have noted here, it 
is essential to assess whether a valid explanation has been 
given for an ALJ’s statement of a claimant’s limitation to 
“simple tasks.” 
 
C. The ALJ Offered a “Valid Explanation” 
 
The final question, then, is whether the ALJ in this case 
offered a valid explanation.17  The government argues that the 
ALJ did so by analyzing Hess’s difficulties in “concentration, 
persistence, or pace” and concluding that they were not so 
serious that Hess could not perform simple tasks.  Hess’s only 
response is that “the ALJ failed to set forth a supported 
rationale for [her] RFC findings.”  (Answering Br. at 5.)  He 
does not assert that the ALJ mischaracterized the record, only 
that her analysis is flawed. 
 
Having evaluated that analysis, we are persuaded that 
the ALJ did offer a valid explanation for her “simple tasks” 
limitation.  As indicated by our detailed description of her 
                                              
17 As just stated, the District Court did not consider that 
issue.  “[W]e ordinarily do not consider issues not addressed 
by the district court in the first instance.”  Howard Hess Dental 
Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 253 n.6 (3d Cir. 
2010).  But, “[w]e may decide a question not addressed by the 
District Court when ‘the record has been sufficiently 
developed for us to resolve [the] legal issue.’”  Chehazeh v. 
Att’y Gen., 666 F.3d 118, 140 (3d Cir. 2012) (second alteration 
in original) (citation omitted).  Here, the record as to the 
adequacy of the ALJ’s explanation has been sufficiently 
developed. 
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opinion, the ALJ explained at length and with sound reasoning 
why Hess’s “moderate” difficulties in “concentration, 
persistence, or pace” were not so significant that Hess was 
incapable of performing “simple tasks.”  For example, coupled 
with her finding that Hess had “moderate difficulties” in 
“concentration, persistence or pace,” the ALJ explained that 
Hess’s “self-reported activities of daily living, such as doing 
laundry, taking care of his personal needs, shopping, working, 
and paying bills (when he has money), … are consistent with 
an individual who is able to perform simple, routine tasks.”  
(App. at 32.)  In the same discussion, the ALJ also observed 
that “progress notes from treating and examining sources 
generally indicate no serious problems in this area of 
functioning, reporting that [Hess] could perform simple 
calculations, was fully oriented, and had intact remote/recent 
memory.”  (App. at 32 (citations omitted).) 
 
Likewise, in her meticulous analysis of the record at 
step four of the disability analysis, the ALJ highlighted, among 
other things, the following: mental status examinations and 
reports that revealed that Hess could function effectively; 
opinion evidence showing that Hess could do simple work; and 
Hess’s activities of daily living, which demonstrated that he is 
capable of engaging in a diverse array of “simple tasks,” such 
as “work[ing] three days a week for five to six hours as a 
dishwasher[.]”  (App. at 37.)  She additionally noted that there 
were no “reports of behavioral issues or problems completing 
tasks” during a significant period of close observation, and that 
the record “did not reveal frequent or regular serious 
symptoms.”  (App. at 37-38 (citations omitted).)  The ALJ’s 
review of the record, moreover, led her to give little weight to 
assertions that Hess had serious mental difficulties and to credit 
evidence that Hess could perform simple work.  After all of 
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that, the ALJ explained that “appropriate limitations” were 
imposed to reflect Hess’s mental impairments and that Hess’s 
“impairments and the restrictions caused by them would not 
prevent him from performing sedentary, unskilled work as 
defined … in the [RFC].”  (App. at 38-39.) 
 
We think the ALJ’s detailed explanation was 
sufficient.18  Indeed, the record evidence the ALJ cited in 
reasoning that a “simple tasks” limitation was appropriate is 
comparable to, or even stronger than, evidence that certain of 
our sister circuits have found to support similar limitations.19 
                                              
18 It gives us some pause that the ALJ did not address in 
her opinion her follow-up colloquy with the vocational expert, 
during which the ALJ posed questions that could bear on 
limitations in “concentration, persistence, or pace” and that the 
vocational expert admitted would prevent full-time 
competitive employment.  It would likely avoid unnecessary 
litigation if ALJs, under these circumstances, incorporated 
seemingly relevant responses from vocational experts such as 
those into their disability analyses.  But, the follow-up colloquy 
does not appear to have affected the ALJ’s conclusions or 
decision.  (See App. at 40 (“Based on the testimony of the 
vocational expert, the undersigned concludes that, considering 
[Hess’s] age, education, work experience, and [RFC], [Hess] 
is capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that 
exists in significant numbers in the national economy.”).)  And, 
no one contends that the ALJ’s opinion was deficient for not 
explicitly mentioning that colloquy.  
 
19 See Scott, 855 F.3d at 855, 858 (holding that a 
hypothetical question that “provided for medium, unskilled 
work involving ‘personal contact that is incidental to the work 
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In sum, the ALJ’s limitation “to jobs requiring 
understanding, remembering, and carrying out only simple 
instructions and making only simple work-related decisions[,]” 
(App. at 33-34,) was supported by a “valid explanation” and so 
                                              
performed,’ requiring ‘little independent judgment … [and] 
simple, direct, and … very brief’ supervision” was sufficient to 
account for a claimant’s “moderate difficulties in 
concentration, persistence, or pace” where the ALJ 
acknowledged the claimant’s “reading, writing, and math 
difficulties, … his history of special education and failure to 
finish high school[,]” his self-described “reduced attention 
span,” and “that consultative examiners noted a slow pace[,]” 
but also explained that the claimant “‘retains the focus 
necessary to watch three hours of television per day[,]’ … does 
not require reminders[,]” and “demonstrated good 
concentration and persistence during consultative 
examinations” (first alteration in original)); Vigil, 805 F.3d at 
1203-04 (holding that “the ALJ accounted for [a claimant’s] 
moderate concentration, persistence, and pace problems in his 
RFC assessment by limiting him to unskilled work” because, 
despite finding “some evidence indicating that [the claimant] 
had some problems with concentration, persistence, and pace 
‘such that [he] could not be expected to perform complex 
tasks[,]’” the ALJ also “found that ‘the findings of a normal 
ability to recall items on immediate recall, and an ability to 
spell words forward, as well as finding of normal thought 
processes, indicate[d] that [the claimant] retain[ed] enough 
memory and concentration to perform at least simple tasks’” 
(third, fifth, and seventh alterations in original) (citations 
omitted)). 
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was appropriate.  The administrative decision should therefore 
have been upheld. 
 
III.   CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment 
of the District Court and remand with instructions to enter 
judgment for the government.  
